Tuesday, 16 December 2014

ASPiH 2014 annual conference: The plus and the delta (by M Moneypenny)

The 2014 Association for Simulated Practice in Healthcare (ASPiH) annual conference took place in Nottingham between the 11th-13th November. The following is not a definitive overview of the conference and if you feel strongly that something has been missed out, then please do comment at the bottom!

The plus

The keynote lecturers were very good, with lots of food for thought and a few lightbulb moments.

ASPiH Laerdal keynote lecture by Hege Ersdal (SAFER, Norway): Low-dose high-frequency simulation: saving lives of babies on a global scale

Hege gave a moving keynote looking at work carried out in Tanzania. A 1-day course was delivered which tried to teach the importance of the "golden minute" after birth. She showed promising results of a 50% decrease in neonatal deaths in the region, however when further analysed it showed that the 50% figure hid a significant disparity between centres, some had a much greater decrease, some had none. Hege and her team found that local implementation was hampered at some sites and that frequent onsite training was the major determinant of improvement (rather than having attended a 1-day course). The team therefore implemented mandatory low-dose high-frequency training in the labour ward, supported by local leaders and the hospital management. This led on to the argument that patient outcome depends on three factors:

  1. Science
  2. Educational Efficiency
  3. Local implementation

Hege also explained that their simulation was carried out using a technically low-fidelity mannequin (see Al May's great tweet) which makes the point that you don't need a SimNewB (or equivalent) for every labour ward.

In terms of "take home messages" for high-income countries, Hege felt that frequent in-situ simulation may be under-utilised.


Day 1 Closing keynote by Mark Gilman (Public Health England): Changing the bigger picture - the real driver to support new behaviours and lifestyles: lessons from addiction


Mark, a criminologist, talked about a smorgasbord of topics surrounding addiction. Unfortunately no amount of text can replace the experience of hearing Mark talk passionately about his work.  He discussed how PHE was managing to keep people with addictions alive, keep them out of prison, control blood-borne viruses and, at times, rehabilitate them. Mark discussed how the "big picture" has a tremendous effect on rehabilitation. If you have no friends, no job and no money then what is the incentive to stay sober or drug-free? He finished by telling us about the "5 ways to wellbeing" which applies to everybody.



Keynote lecture by Justin Moseley (National Air Traffic Services): Towing the Iceberg: Can education and training change the culture of professional practice?

Justin started his lecture with an impressive video showing the air traffic over Europe in a 24-hour period. He then told us about an equally impressive simulated training programme, with a mandatory annual component as well as on an ad-hoc basis for new equipment and procedures.

NATS has a dedicated team of expert investigators of "incidents", of which there are >2000/year in the UK. The team can release an immediate safety notice if necessary, as well interview all involved parties and creates a report (full or abbreviated) for every incident. Reporting incidents at NATS is now natural and commonplace, it used to be "I'm going to file a report on YOU!"

According to Justin, despite being a part of the "aviation" industry, TRM in air traffic control is relatively new but a TRM annual assessment will be a European Aviation Safety Agency requirement in the near future.

In terms of advice for others, Justin recommends sharing incidents, near misses and experience. He also encourages a "Safety II" approach, trying to do less "Don't do that!" and more "Do more of this!" Lastly he talked about how a "Just Culture" (which is not a "No Blame" culture) underpins Safety II and echoes Sidney Dekker by calling for "the line" (which must not be crossed) to be drawn by those who are actively involved in the job.


Day 2 Closing Keynote by Sebastian Yuen: Engaging your community: Being the change you wish to see

Sebastian talked about the rise (or arrival) of the #SocialEra with personalised healthcare and a fall in the power of big business. He talked about the power of communities and connections, and the need to engage with patients and people. He also talked about the effect of behaviour and showed a slide which  referred to a statement from Public Health England. It said:
"Our effectiveness depends on how we behave so we will:

  • consistently spend our time on what we say we care about
  • work together, not undermine each other
  • speak well of each other, in public and in private
  • behave well, especially when things go wrong
  • keep our promises, small and large
  • speak with candour and courage"
Which seems not a bad set of principles for simulation centres and hospitals.


The delta
Other than my lost suitcase there was very little I would change. One area of concern is the SimHeroes concept… With pre-conference heats, then semi-finals and finals it brings perhaps some excitement to the conference. However the notion of rating performance (in particular non-technical skills) makes one wonder about rater training, reliability, validity, etc. In addition, the focus on the performance in the simulation rather than the debrief perhaps emphasises the wrong aspect of simulation-based education. On the plus side, if the concept continues then we will quickly get a glimpse of what the future of gaming/beating the simulator will look like, as teams attempt to win first place.


See you next year

The next ASPiH annual conference is in Brighton, 3rd-5th November 2015. See you there?!



Friday, 28 November 2014

Book of the month: Managing Maintenance Error (A Practical Guide) by Reason and Hobbs

About the authors

James Reason is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Manchester and one of the best-known names in the field of human factors (he came up with the Swiss cheese model of system failure).
Alan Hobbs is a Senior Research Associate at NASA's Human Systems Integration Division with a background as a human performance investigator at the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation.

 

Who should read this book?

The authors' target readership is "people who manage, supervise or carry out maintenance activities in a wide range of industries." Simulation technicians and managers may therefore find some useful advice about maintenance of sophisticated equipment such as mannequins and audiovisual systems. The book will also appeal to human factors enthusiasts as it explores the unfamiliar world of the routine (maintenance) rather than the more familiar world (to simulation educators) of the crisis. The book will also be of interest to anybody who is involved in creating a "safety culture" or in analysing errors. Lastly, surgeons and other healthcare professionals who carry out maintenance-style tasks may enjoy this book. The authors talk of performing tasks in "poorly lit spaces with less-than-adequate tools, and usually under severe time pressure"; this may strike a chord with some...


In summary

The authors main argument is that maintenance error is a major, but under-investigated, cause of system failure. As automation increases, the maintenance of the automated systems, which is still primarily carried out by human beings, can lead to failure by omission (not stopping a fault) or commission (introducing a fault).

The book consists of 12 chapters:

  1. Human Performance Problems in Maintenance
  2. The Human Risks
  3. The Fundamentals of Human Performance
  4. The Varieties of Error
  5. Local Error-provoking Factors
  6. Three System Failures and a Model of Organizational Accidents
  7. Principles of Error Management
  8. Person and Team Measures
  9. Workplace and Task Measures
  10. Organizational measures
  11. Safety culture
  12. Making it Happen: The Management of Error Management


In a bit more detail

Chapter 1: Human Performance Problems in Maintenance
Reason and Hobbs make their case about the importance of maintenance error and its effects (including Apollo 13, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Clapham Junction and Piper Alpha). They give us the "good news" that errors are generally not random. Instead, if one looks, one can find "systematic and recurrent patterns" and error traps.

Chapter 2: The Human Risks
The authors inform us that errors are "universal… unintended… (and) merely the downside of having a brain". They argue against trying to change the human condition (human nature) and ask organisations to focus their efforts on changing the conditions in which people work. They also tell us that errors are and should be expected and, in many cases, foreseeable.

Chapter 3: The Fundamentals of Human Performance
Using the activity space to define the 3 performance levels (p.29)
This chapter details human performance and its limitations in terms of attention,  vigilance, fatigue and stress. The authors also mention the "paradox of expertise", where highly skilled people can no longer describe what they are doing. (Teaching your teenage son or daughter how to drive the car might come to mind for some.) The authors explain automatic and conscious control modes (Kahneman's system 1 and system 2), Rasmussen's knowledge-/rule-/skill-based performance taxonomy and then combine them into a useful diagram. Reason and Hobbs also lay out the principal stages in skill acquisition and show how fatigue and stress cause us to revert back to more effortful ways of performing. The Yerkes-Dodson "inverted U-curve" is also referred to and explained.

Chapter 4: The Varieties of Error
Reason and Hobbs' definition of error is:
"An error is a failure of planned actions to achieve their desired goal, where this occurs without some unforeseeable or chance intervention."
They divide error into 3 types:

  1. Skill (failure at action stage): may be a recognition failure, memory failure or slip
  2. Mistake (failure at planning stage): may be rule-based (involving incorrect assumption or bad habit) or knowledge-based (involving failed problem-solving or lack of system knowledge)
  3. Violation (may be routine, thrill-seeking or optimising, and situational)
They then go on to look at the major types of unsafe acts that occur in maintenance. 

Chapter 5: Local Error-provoking Factors
Reason and Hobbs argue that, although there are many possible local factors, there are only a few  which are implicated in the majority of maintenance errors:

  • Documentation
  • Housekeeping and Tool Control
  • Coordination and Communication
  • Tools and Equipment
  • Fatigue
  • Knowledge and Experience
  • Bad Procedures
  • Procedure Usage
  • Personal Beliefs
The authors also provide us with a useful diagram showing the link between errors (Ch4) and contributing factors (Ch5). Thus, slips are linked with equipment deficiencies (too many similar-looking dials), while knowledge errors are linked with inadequate training.

Chapter 6: Three System Failures and a Model of Organizational Accidents
In this chapter Reason and Hobbs introduce us to latent conditions (which they compare to dormant pathogens in the human body) and active failures. They then go on to analyse three maintenance-involved incidents: The crash of an Embraer 120 aircraft in 1991, the Clapham Junction railway collision in 1988 and the Piper Alpha oil and gas platform explosion, also in 1988. They end the chapter by talking about the system defences, either to detect errors or to increase the system's resilience.

Chapter 7: Principles of Error Management
Reason and Hobbs provide us with a set of guiding principles of error management, including:
  • Human error is both universal and inevitable
  • Errors are not intrinsically bad
  • You cannot change the human condition, but you can change the conditions in which humans work
  • The best people can make the worst mistakes
  • Errors are Consequences rather than Causes
They complete the chapter by explaining that error management has 3 components: 1) error reduction, 2) error containment and 3) managing the first 2 so that they continue to work.

Chapter 8: Person and Team Measures
Red flag signals
In this chapter Reason and Hobbs discuss error management strategies directed at the person and the team. This includes providing people with knowledge about human performance and "red flags" which should alert the individual to the potential for error. These could be perhaps considered with reference to Reason's 3 bucket model of person, task, context. I.e. if you are tired, carrying out an unfamiliar task and constantly being interrupted, the risk of making a mistake is high.
The authors also stress the importance of the unseen mental changes required before behavioural changes (e.g. breaking a bad habit) are evident, and that these take time.

Chapter 9: Workplace and Task Measures
This chapter looks at environmental and task factors implicated in errors, including: fatigue, task frequency, equipment and environment design etc. 

Chapter 10: Organizational Measures
In this chapter, the authors look at reactive outcome measures and proactive process measures can be used to look for systemic and defensive weaknesses. They also explain how trust and convenience of reporting is essential in order to develop a safety culture. The Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) is used to show how information regarding events can be gathered and used to identity failed defences as well as potential solutions. While Managing Engineering Safety Health (MESH) is provided as an example of a proactive process measure.


Chapter 11: Safety Culture
Reason and Hobbs call this "most important chapter in the book. Without a supportive safety culture, any attempts at error management are likely to have only very limited success." They subdivide the safety culture into 3 sub-components:

  1. Reporting culture (the most important prerequisite for a learning culture)
  2. Just culture
  3. Learning culture
They discuss how it is very difficult or impossible to change people's values but much easier to change practices. They use smoking as an example of a practice which has changed because of a change in controls. Exhortations to stop smoking on national TV made little difference, but banning smoking in public places has had a much greater effect. This chapter also introduces us to some tests for determining culpability: the foresight test (would an average person have predicted that the behaviour was likely to lead to harm?) and the substitution test (could an average person have made the same mistake?)

Chapter 12: Making it Happen: The Management of Error Management
The authors discuss Safety and Quality Management systems and the difference between quality assurance and quality control. (Quality assurance ensures quality is engineered into the product at every stage, quality control is about testing the end product, when it's often too late to rectify mistakes). They also discuss organisational resilience which, they say, is a result of three Cs: commitment, competence and cognisance.


I haven't got time to read 175 pages!

The paragraph entitled "Looking ahead" on page 17 provides an overview of the book. In addition, reading through the useful summary at the end of each chapter will tell you if that chapter is worth reading in detail. Personally I found Chapter 7: Principles of Error Management particularly informative as it covered or put into words some concepts I had not yet seen elsewhere, such as "Errors are Consequences rather than Causes."


What's good about this book?

In the Preface the authors state their intention to "avoid psychobabble" and they are true to their word. Also, some useful concepts (e.g. vigilance decrement (p.24), error cascade (p.43), latent conditions (p.77), 5 stages in breaking a bad habit (p.109)) are explained and placed within the wider context of error.

The summaries at the end of every chapter are quick to read but sufficiently detailed to act as an aide-mémoire. 

Although this is a book about "human" error, Reason and Hobbs underline the fact that people are often the solution to problems and that if we had evolved to be "super-safe" and risk averse we probably would not exist as a species. ("What do you mean, you want to leave the cave?")

Lastly, the authors use real-world examples to illustrate the theory. They also provide practical techniques for tackling error, e.g. "ten criteria for a good reminder" (p.131), while stressing that there is no one best way and that people are capable of devising their own solutions.

What's bad about this book?

Nothing… Honestly cannot find fault with this book, it may not be relevant to everyone but otherwise it is worth the time spent with it.

Final thoughts

One would hope that a book co-authored by Reason would be a good read and this book does not disappoint. For the human factors expert perhaps there is nothing new here, but for the rest of us it is worth reading.



Monday, 24 November 2014

Human factors and the missing suitcase (by M Moneypenny)

The 2014 ASPiH conference took place at the East Midlands Conference Centre in Nottingham. The conference hotel was located a stone's throw away. The free Wi-fi, clean rooms and provision to print out your boarding cards made staying at this award-winning establishment a nice experience. Until the missing suitcase that is…

A timeline of events

Like many hotels, the Orchard Hotel offered a luggage storage facility. I handed in my suitcase and was given a small paper tab, the number on this matched the tag placed on my luggage. For additional security my name was written on the luggage tag. (Fig. 1)

Fig 1: Ironic luggage tag

The suitcase was then taken to a storage area, to be collected at the end of the conference. So far, so normal…

At the end of the conference I wandered over to the hotel reception, luggage tab in hand and was slightly dismayed to find that all the suitcases had been placed in the hotel lobby. "Not great security", I thought. My dismay turned into slight panic when I couldn't find my suitcase amongst the twenty or so that were left. Where was my "Very Important Package"? I asked the front of house manager, who was standing at reception, and she went off to look for it. After about ten minutes she returned to tell me that those were all the suitcases from the conference and was I sure it wasn't there? I was sure… At this stage there was only one suitcase left (which bore only fleeting resemblance to mine) and (by looking inside it) the front of house manager was able to identify the owner.

Fig 2: @TheRealAlMay springs into action
With the power of social media (Fig 2; thanks for the RTs) and Google, we were able to obtain contact details of the supposed lapse-maker. By the time I touched-down in Scotland there was an apologetic email in my inbox. The other person had a similar suitcase at home and had been distracted looking for their coat. They hadn't realised they had the wrong suitcase until they opened it up to do the washing… (No comment).


After a couple of unreturned phone calls I managed to speak to the general manager (GM) of the hotel the next day, to find out how they would endeavour to return the suitcase to me. To my surprise the GM told me that had this been their "fault" they would've made sure a courier had picked it up and returned it to me, but because it wasn't their responsibility they would be willing to pay 50% of the cost. I did my best to explain that if the suitcase had not been placed in the foyer (and what was the point of the luggage tag system anyway?) then it wouldn't have been taken in error. After a polite discussion the GM asked me to leave it with him.

Thankfully my suitcase (and the laptop inside) arrived the next day and I could get back to writing my MD, blog, etc.


Human factors

  1. The luggage tag system I: This is a relatively robust system if the "rules" are followed. You get your tab, you go back with your tab, hand it to the receptionist and tell them your name (as an additional check) and he/she gets your suitcase, having checked the tab and your name with the tag.
  2. The luggage tag system II: This is a very slow system. Especially when over 200 delegates want to pick up their luggage at the same time, which is why the luggage was placed in the foyer for people to "pick your own".
  3. The lapse: It's the end of a long (but engaging) day, you want to catch the train and get back to your family. There is a bit of a problem with finding your coat but you've got your suitcase and you're rushing out to the taxi. (Would the error pass Reason's substitution test? It sure would.)
  4. Blaming the sharp end: The hotel general manager was very keen to point out that this person had walked off with my suitcase and that they (the hotel) was not at fault. Blaming the person at the sharp end is a symptom of poor organisational culture.

Lessons learned

My suitcase now has a very distinctive red and white ribbon to make it look more "unique". Unfortunately this probably also makes it stand out more for opportunistic thieves…..

Friday, 3 October 2014

Sound the alarm!

US Secret Service under scrutiny

On 19th September 2014, an intruder armed with a knife scaled a fence surrounding the White House in Washington, DC. He managed to run across the North lawn, past a guard posted in the entrance hall and the stairs to the living quarters, before being tackled in the East Room. There were a number of factors involved in his success in accessing one of the most iconic buildings in the world, as detailed in this Washington Post article

One suggested contributing factor was the muting of an intruder alarm which would have alerted the guard in the entrance hall that the perimeter had been breached. According to the Washington Post, "White House usher staff, whose office is near the front door, complained that they were noisy" and "were frequently malfunctioning and unnecessarily sounding off."

Alarms, or their equivalents, have a number of everyday uses such as waking us up in the morning, telling us we've left the car headlights on, or informing us that we've burned the toast again. In healthcare, alarms are meant to draw our attention to occurrences which need to be acknowledged or require action. However, just as happened with the Secret Service, alarms (and their misuse) can cause their own problems.

The 4 most common abuses of alarms

(This is a list derived from personal experience and observations in the simulation centre, it is not definitive)

1) Alarm not switched on
Some healthcare devices allow alarms to be set but these are not the default option. For example the "low anaesthetic gas" alarm is often switched off by default by the manufacturer of the anaesthetic machine. Their reasoning may be that the alarm will sound inappropriately during the wash-in phase of anaesthesia as the anaesthetic gas increases from 0% to the set concentration. The down-side is that inattention by the anaesthetist may lead to patient awareness under anaesthesia if the anaesthetic gas falls below an appropriate level. A contributing factor to the lack of attention paid to the anaesthetic gas level may be a (not unreasonable) assumption that the machine would warn the anaesthetist of low anaesthetic level as the machine does alarm for most other variables if they are below a safe level.

2) Inappropriate alarm limits
Most alarms have default limits set by the manufacturer of the device. A pump may alarm if a given pressure is exceeded or an ECG machine may alarm if a given heart rate is not achieved. Some default limits are however outside safe levels. For example, some oxygen saturation monitors will not alarm until the saturation falls below 90%. With normal saturations of 99-100%, many healthcare personnel would prefer to be alerted at a higher level in order to begin countermeasures. 

3) Alarm not muted
One consequence of not muting an alarm is that the noise may be "tuned out" and therefore ignored. Another consequence is that some healthcare devices do not change tone as alarms stack up, i.e. if a second variable, such as heart rate, causes another alarm to trigger when the first alarm is still sounding, the original alarm masks the new alarm.

4) Alarm muted inappropriately
This was the case with the White House intruder and the ushers did not feel it was inappropriate at the time. The decision as to whether an alarm was muted inappropriately is often one taken in hindsight. The consequences are obvious, an alarm does not sound when it is supposed to. In addition, a false sense of security may occur, especially if not everyone is aware that the alarm is muted. In the White House example, the guards on the North Lawn pursuing the intruder may have believed that he would not gain access to the entrance hall as the guard inside is meant to lock the door if the alarm sounds.


Solutions

Intruder alarms tend to have low specificity and high sensitivity which may lead to repeated activation. In the White House case, with the wonderful retrospectoscope, the muting of the intruder alarm should have triggered an investigation and a search for alternative solutions. Perhaps the alarm could be a visual rather than auditory one, or perhaps the alarm could be relayed to an earpiece carried by the guard.

As always there is not one but many "solutions". Device users should be trained to know what the alarm settings are, how to alter them and the possible consequences of alarm (mis)use. Organisations should be aware of how their devices are being used, should set standards for critical alarm defaults and examine near-misses and critical events where alarms were contributory factors. Device manufacturers should involve end-users from the design stage of the equipment, should test their devices under realistic conditions (e.g. in a simulator) and should act on feedback from end-users to modify their devices.